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AB-5 and Drive: Worker Classification in the Gig
Economy
Kai Thordarson
ABSTRACT
Gig-economy platforms such as Uber and Lyft rely on their drivers as
the backbone of their ride-sharing operations. These drivers, typically
classified as independent contractors, are in a state of regulatory flux
regarding their worker classification. Due to the novelty of the workeremployee relationship in gig-economy platforms, these drivers exist in a
regulatory gray area. California, with its very recent (and very controversial)
Assembly Bill 5, has changed its operative worker-classification formulation
to the worker-friendly “ABC” test in an attempt to statutorily modernize the
burgeoning industry. In addition to analyzing the range of tests and their
effect on the gig industry, this note will examine both the potential for the
addition of a third “hybrid” worker classification category and California’s
judicial evolution from the common law “Right to Control” test to the
“ABC” test to determine if it is a trend or an aberration.
INTRODUCTION
Uber and Lyft are app-based transportation platforms that allow
smartphone users to connect to and travel with nearby drivers.1 Rather than
paying the driver after the trip is completed, riders store their credit card
information on the app, and their credit card is immediately charged once the
ride is completed.2 Riders are offered an upfront price, consisting of a base


Kai Thordarson a third-year student, focusing on labor and employment law. He works at a
small plaintiff-side personal injury and bad faith insurance firm. Kai has served on the
Hastings Business Law Journal since his second year of law school. In his free time, Kai likes
to travel (when travel advisories are not in place).
1. How Lyft Works, https://www.lyft.com/blog/posts/how-does-lyft-work/ (last visited
Jan. 18, 2020); What is Uber? https://help.uber.com/driving-and-delivering/article/what-isuber?nodeId=eac2e43e-af42-4521-a042-2982c18664af (last visited Jan. 18, 2020).
2. See A guide for how to use Uber, https://www.uber.com/us/en/ride/how-it-works/
(last visited Jan. 21, 2020); How Lyft Works, https://www.lyft.com/blog/posts/how-does-lyftwork/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
[137]

5 - NOTE_THORDARSON_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

138

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

12/7/2020 9:15 AM

[Vol. N:ppp

charge and a cost per mile and cost per minute.3 Both platforms have
algorithms that increase prices when the demand for drivers exceeds the
number of available drivers on the road.4 Uber and Lyft take roughly 22 and
27 percent of the total trip fare, respectively, and the rest is distributed to the
driver.5
Before they can start accepting trip requests, Uber and Lyft drivers must
apply and be approved online.6 Uber and Lyft Drivers receive approximately
70% of the fares paid by passengers.7 Drivers are drawn to ride-sharing
platforms primarily because of their flexibility: drivers use their own cars,
choose their own hours and territory, and need not wear a uniform.8 Both
Uber and Lyft accentuate the freedom that their platform provides, boasting
that drivers are given the opportunity to “be their own boss.”9 Furthermore,
the barriers to entry are low: UberX drivers are required to merely (1)
maintain a valid driver’s license and have proof of insurance, (2) have at
least one year of driving experience in the United States, (3) meet the
minimum age to drive in the city, and (4) use an eligible four-door vehicle.10
Uber has even abandoned its requirement that drivers accept at least eighty
percent of their trip requests to maintain employment.11 Owingin part to the
flexibility and accessibility of the program, most Uber drivers have either a

3. How are fares calculated?, https://help.uber.com/riders/article/how-are-fares-calcul
ated/?nodeId=d2d43bbc-f4bb-4882-b8bb-4bd8acf03a9d (last visited Jan. 21, 2020); How
Lyft Works, https://www.lyft.com/blog/posts/how-does-lyft-work/ (last visited Jan. 21,
2020).
4. How surge pricing works, https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/driver-app/how-surgeworks/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2020); How Lyft Works, https://www.lyft.com/blog/posts/howdoes-lyft-work/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
5. Sasha Lekach, Hey drivers, use this to discover how much Uber and Lyft take from
you, MASHABLE (Aug. 26, 2019 10:41 AM), https://mashable.com/article/uber-lyft-driverearnings-jalopnik-fares/.
6. Andrew G. Malik, Note, Worker Classification and the Gig-Economy, 69 RUTGERS
U. L. REV. 1729, 1747 (2017); see Learn what you need to drive with Lyft, https://www.
lyft.com/driver-application-requirements (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
7. Lekach, supra note 5.
8. Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 99
(2015).
9. Do you want to become an Uber partner-driver? With Uber, you are your own boss,
https://www.uber.com/en-NL/blog/do-you-want-to-become-an-uber-partner-driver-with-ube
r-you-are-your-own-boss/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2020); Is driving with Lyft right for you?
https://www.lyft.com/driving-jobs (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
10. Driver Requirements, https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/requirements/ (depending
on the city, some additional requirements may apply) (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
11. ROSS EISENBREY & LAWRENCE MISHEL, UBER BUSINESS MODEL DOES NOT JUSTIFY
A NEW “INDEPENDENT WORKER’ CATEGORY, Econ. Pol’y Inst. (2016); Driver Deactivation
Policy - US ONLY, https://www.uber.com /legal/deactivation-policy/us (last visited Feb. 2,
2020)
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full-time or part-time job apart from Uber.12 Similarly, ninety percent of Lyft
drivers work fewer than twenty hours per week.13
Uber and Lyft drivers are hired as independent contractors,14 and Uber
has gone as far as claiming that they are a “technology company” and not a
“transportation company.”15 In their Guidelines for Third Party Data
Requests, Uber describes itself as a “technology company that has developed
an app that connects users (riders) with third party transportation
providers.”16 In one sense, this characterization can be seen as
straightforward and reasonable. After all, it could be argued that Uber and
Lyft merely facilitate a transaction between consumer and supplier, and the
supplier has a wide degree of discretion concerning their work. However,
courts have been reluctant to accept this interpretation. In 2015, the
California Northern District Court rejected Uber’s argument that it was
merely a “technology company,” pointing to the fact that “Uber does not
simply sell software; it sells rides.”17 Moreover, Uber gains its revenues from
customers requesting rides, not on the distribution of its software.18
Courts have also pushed back against the notion that Uber and Lyft
driver’s freedom to choose their hours indicates a lack of control by the
companies, stating that the more relevant inquiry is the degree of control that
the platform can exercise while drivers are on duty.19 Ultimately, gig
economy platforms’ unique business model as facilitators between
consumers and suppliers provides uncertainty when fit into the current
worker classification framework, an uncertainty that courts have had to
grapple with since the inception of ride-sharing.20
12. Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor market For Uber’s
Driver-Partners in the United States (Princeton Univ., Indus. Relations Section, Working
Paper No. 587, 2015) (quoting that A December 2014 survey found that, “Uber’s driverpartners fall into three roughly equal-sized groups: driver-partners who are partnering with
Uber and have no other job [38 percent], driver-partners who work full-time on another job
and partner with Uber [31 percent], and driver-partners who have a part-time job apart from
Uber and partner with Uber [30 percent].”).
13. Economic Impact Report 2020, https://www.lyftimpact.com/stats/national (last
visited Feb. 2, 2020).
14. Akasha C. Perez, Comment, Addressing an Evolution in America’s Workforce: A
Call for Negotiated Rulemaking in the Ridesharing Industry, 59 HOW. L.J. 787, 792 (2016).
15. O’Connor v. Uber Tech. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
16. Uber Guidelines for Third Party Data Requests and Service of Legal Documents,
https://www.uber.com/legal/en/document/?name=guidelines-for-third-party-data-requests&
country=united-states&lang=e (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
17. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1141.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1152.
20. Blake E. Stafford, Comment, Riding the Line Between “Employee” and
“Independent Contractor” in the Modern Sharing Economy, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1223,
1238 (2016).
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The 2010s saw a dramatic rise in the popularity of the so-called “gig”
(or “on-demand”) economy. Similar to the social media explosion of the
decade before, apps like Uber and Lyft evolved from Silicon Valley startups to industry giants, breathing life into a brand-new sector of the economy.
Their employees, known as “gig workers” because of their unorthodox and
somewhat informal relationship with their employer, are in a tenuous
position regarding their legal classification as workers.
Employee classifications determine whether workers have access to the
protections of labor and employment laws, such as minimum wage, the right
to organize, and unemployment compensation.21 According to the
Department of Labor, “employee misclassification generates substantial
losses to the federal government and state governments in the form of lower
tax revenues, as well as to state unemployment insurance and workers’
compensation funds.”22 The high-profile ride-hailing platform Uber
classifies its workers as “independent contractors” rather than “workers,”
meaning that they do not have access to such benefits.23 Uber claims that
workers pick their service because “they love being their own boss,” but
many employees find that the denial of benefits has relegated them to a much
lower position.24 In courtrooms across America, legal disputes continue
between drivers and Uber concerning worker-classifications and their
resultant benefits.25
Importantly, this area of jurisprudence affects not only Uber and Lyft
drivers, but workers directly involved in the tech industry as well.
Increasingly, computer-based work has been subject to the “crowd-work” or
“crowd-sourced” model, wherein complicated digital work is broken down
and distributed to employees piecemeal so that issues can be resolved with
greater efficiency.26 Like Uber drivers, crowd-sourced employees are
typically classified as independent contractors, though the scope of their
employment and their relationship with their employer varies.27 Other lines
of work will be affected profoundly by worker-classification law as well,

21. Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent Contractors” in the Gig Economy,
66 AM. U. L. REV. 635, 637 (2017).
22. DEPT. OF LAB. WAGE AND HOUR DIV., MISCLASSIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES AS
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/flsa/misclassification
23. Alexander M. Tait, Note, Uber Everywhere; But Where is the Driver’s Destination
in New York?, 36 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 383, 384 - 85 (2019).
24. Id. at 384.
25. CHERRY & ALOISI, supra note 21, at 646.
26. Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA. L. REV. 951, 956 (2011).
27. Malik, supra note 6, at 1751.
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such as independent truckers and freelance writers.28 Though the primary
focus of this paper lies with the workers in the on-demand economy, it is
important to also consider the effects of worker-classifications in crowdsourced and other models.
This paper aims to produce a comparative analysis of workerclassification employment tests that govern the gig economy by analyzing
economic, social, legislative, and judicial trends towards recognizing gig
workers as employees rather than independent contractors and the
consequent far-reaching implications for both platforms and workers in the
industry. Furthermore, it will feature both an examination the possibility of
a third “hybrid” worker classification as well as a study of California’s
transition from the common law to the ABC test.
FROM “CONTROL” TO ABC: THE RANGE OF TESTS
The “Right to Control” Tests
Common Law Agency
The Common Law Agency “Right to Control” test finds its origins in
the Restatement (First) of Agency. The motive for discerning worker status
in agency law emerged out of the doctrine of respondeat superior.29 In order
to define when an employer had vicarious liability for the tortious acts of its
agents, the American Law Institute adopted a test that was reflective of
common law practices in 1933.30 Section 220 of the Restatement defined a
servant as “a person employed to perform service for another in his affairs
and who, with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the
service, is subject to the other’s control or right to control.”31 This rubric was
supplemented by a flexible ad hoc multifactor test, ostensibly to guide courts
in determining the existence of a relationship that is “not capable of exact
definition.”32 The American Law Institute listed the following factors for
consideration33:

28. Don Thompson, Judge stalls California labor law as it relates to truckers, (Dec. 31,
2019, 7:55 PM), https://www.startribune.com/judge-stalls-california-labor-law-as-it-relatesto-truckers/566617981/.
29. Ryan Vacca, Uncertainty in Employee Status Across Federal Law, 92 TEMP. L. REV.
121, 125-6 (2019).
30. Id. at 126.
31. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1933).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality,
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a
specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the
work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer; and
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship
of master and servant.
Not all factors must be met, and no formula exists as to how much
weight to be given to each factor, or how each factor should be balanced.34
The most determinant factor, however, came to be the employer’s control
over the nature and performance of the work.35
Federally, the common law agency test enjoys wide adherence. With
some slight variations, the test is used to determine “employee” status in
ERISA, COBRA, ADA, USERRA, OSHA, NLRA and FLSA claims.36
Variations of the test are also utilized in a significant minority of states,
including Texas, New York, and Florida.37

34. Griffin T. Pivateau, Rethinking the Worker Classification Test: Employees,
Entrepreneurship, and Empowerment, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 67, 77 (2013).
35. Id.
36. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992).
37. Employee or Contractor? The Complete List of Worker Classification Tests By State
(Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.wrapbook.com/worker-classification-tests-by-state/.
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However, the “Right to Control” test has received more than its fair
share of criticism. Opponents of the test have noted that reliance on the
control of the employer causes courts to base their opinions on easily
measured, quantitative factors, resulting in a “mechanistic” and rigid
analysis of the employment relationship.38 Furthermore, critics argue that the
test places far too much weight on the formal employment relationship
structure between an employer and a putative employee, rather than focusing
on the reality of the arrangement.39 This encourages courts to collapse the
wide range of possible employment relationships into one convenient
category: independent contractor.40
A fundamental issue with determining worker classification based on
employer control and formal employment relationship structure is that it
creates an opportunity for employers to contort the terms and conditions of
employment to restrict employment benefits to workers.41 The test unfairly
benefits employers by limiting its analysis to only those factors which are
evaluated from the employer’s perspective, leaving factors relating to the
worker’s dependence on the employer completely out of the analytical
framework.42
Furthermore, the common law agency test is outdated. With modern
business models such as crowd-sourcing,43 factors such as whether the
employer provides the “the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work”
have become meaningless.44 While these factors may have been relevant at
the time of their inception, the rise in ‘telecommuting’ (working from a
remote location) has rendered them anachronistic.45
Finally, there is a fundamental incongruence between the purposes for
which the common law agency test was created and the purposes of the
statutes to which it is now applied. Statutes creating employee benefits such
as workers compensation and Title VII protection contain language that
evinces a broad, remedial intent to encompass the overwhelming majority of
the working population.46 In contrast, the common law agency test was
38. Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26
WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 83 (1984).
39. Id. at 84.
40. Id. at 85.
41. Id. at 86.
42. Id.
43. See CHERRY, supra note 26, at 956.
44. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220(E) (AM. LAW INST. 1933).
45. John A. Pearce II & Jonathan P. Silva, The Future of Independent Contractors and
Their Status as Non-Employees: Moving on from a Common Law Standard, 14 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 1, 20 (2018).
46. See S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 359
(1989); see Dowd, supra note at 38, at 86.
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created in order to determine whether the hirer should be held vicariously
liable for the injuries to third parties caused by a worker.47 In that context,
the rubric of control is undoubtedly crucial, because the degree of control
exercised by the hiring entity may justify the imposition of vicarious
liability.48
A great deal of legislation for the protection of employees in the 20thcentury adopted the “independent contractor” distinction as an express or
implied limitation on coverage, and either expressly or impliedly insert the
common law “Right of Control” test in the statutory definition of
“employ.”49 However, several state courts have decided that despite an
express emphasis on “control” as the principle distinction between employee
and independent contractor, statutes should still be read with a consideration
of the remedial purposes of the statute.50 In a case interpreting Alaska’s
Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Alaskan Supreme Court rejected the test,
stating that it was “too narrow a criterion for determination of employee
status in light of the rationale of compensation acts.”51
The NLRA and Federal Statutory Interpretation
Federally, this mismatch in statutory purpose is attributable to both poor
legislative drafting and Congressional reactionism. Federal cases involving
the interpretation of New Deal social welfare legislation in the first half of
the 20th century used statutory purpose as a primary touchstone in their
analysis.52 In both Hearst and Silk, the Supreme Court was tasked with
interpreting the term “employee” in both the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”) and the Social Security Act (“SSA”), respectively.53 In both
cases, the Court was forced to engage in protracted discussion of statutory
interpretation primarily because of circular, unhelpful statutory definitions.54
For both the NLRA and the SSA, the Court chose a definition of the term
47. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1933).
48. Borello, 48 Cal. 3d at 350.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 352-53; See, e.g., Grothe v. Olafson, 659 P.2d 602, 605 (Alaska 1983) (“control
of details” definition repealed in 1959).
51. Searfus v. N. Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966, 969 (Alaska 1970).
52. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publs., 322 U.S. 22, 124–9 (1944); United States v. Silk,
331 U.S. 704, 711–714 (1947).
53. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 122; Silk, 331 U.S. at 712.
54. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (“definition of
‘employee’ as ‘any individual employed by an employer,’ 29 U. S. C. § 1002(6), is completely
circular and explains nothing”); see Silk, 331 U.S. at 711 (“‘Employment’ means ‘any service,
of whatever nature, performed . . . by an employee for his employer, except . . . agricultural
labor . . .’”).
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that reflected the broad, remedial purposes of the statute at issue, pointing
out that the purported simplicity of a uniform application of the common law
test was counterproductive.55
After the decisions in Hearst and Silk, Congress amended the statute to
clarify that the common law agency test was the proper analytical framework
for determining the meaning of “employee.”56 Between 1947 and 1949, the
Republican-led Eightieth Congress took it upon itself to roll back New Deal
labor and employment protections, seeking to contain union power and
reprivatize collective bargaining.57 In the House Report detailing Congress’
opposition to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “employee” in the
NLRA in Hearst, the Court was accused of overreliance on the NLRB’s
purportedly aggressively expansive definition of the term, stating that
Congress had intended “employee” to be interpreted “according to all
standard dictionaries,” meaning “someone who works for another for hire.”58
However, the legislative history of the NLRA, which predates the
Eightieth Congress, suggests otherwise. During the House Debates before
the NLRA was passed in 1935, the bill’s sponsor stated, “We are talking
about all the working people of the country. We say that we want all workers
to have the right to bargain collectively.”59 The drafters of the bill understood
that modern business structures had evolved past the need for a simple
employee-independent contractor distinction, and instead strove for a more
adaptable test capable of consistent application.60 The House Report stresses
that even workers with multiple employers or fewer than ten fellow
employees should be afforded bargaining power, recognizing that, “in some
industries, such as motion pictures and trucking, employee units of 3, 2, and
even 1 are not at all uncommon.”61
Even the opponents of the NLRA at the time of its drafting did not take
issue with the meaning of “employee” in the bill.62 James Emery, the General
Counsel of the National Association of Manufacturers, opposed the bill
during the Senate hearings but implicitly acknowledged that taxi workers
would benefit as “employees” protected by the NLRA.63 Now, with help
55. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 122; Silk, 331 U.S. at 712.
56. Darden, 503 U.S. at 324-25.
57. V.B. Duval, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker
Identities, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 65, 86 (2017); Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A SlaveLabor Law?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763, 779 (1998).
58. H.R. REP. NO. 245, at 18 (1947).
59. V.B. Duval, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker
Identities, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 65, 83 (2017).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 84.
63. Id.
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from the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act, workers across
the transportation industry, including taxi and FedEx drivers, are
“independent contractors” under the NLRA.64
Despite the text of the NLRA and the legislative history indicating a
resistance against the implementation of a patchwork plan for determining
workers’ rights to organize and collectively bargain, the pro-business bent of
the Eightieth Congress effectively precluded the right to organize for
workers in the transportation industry.65 Now, the omission of a statutory
definition of “employee” in congressional enactments can be read as
legislative shorthand for the imposition of the common law agency test.66
The IRS “Right to Control” Test
The IRS common law variation of the “right to control” test, adopted in
1987, originally included twenty factors culled from examinations and
rulings.67 Worker classification is important to the IRS because an
independent contractor’s earnings are subject to a self-employment tax,
whereas an employer must withhold income taxes and pay Social Security,
Medicare taxes and unemployment tax on wages paid to an employee.68 In
2004, because of the difficulty of applying the abundance of factors and their
waning relevance due to changes in business practices, the IRS opted for a
modernized and more organized formulation.69 Instead of twenty freefloating factors, the test now groups evidence into three categories:
behavioral control, financial control, and relationship of the parties.70
Though the categories simplify the test, each of the three categories contains
several subfactors for courts to consider, leaving a total of thirteen possible
factors for the court to analyze.71
64. Id. at 90.
65. Id. at 86. See Hearst, 322 U.S. at 123.
66. See, e. g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-740
(1989) (“[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the
common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to
incorporate the established meaning of these terms.” (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453
U.S. 322, 329 (1981))).
67. I.R.S., Information Letter No. INFO 2004-0087 (Apr. 8, 2004), https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-wd/04-0087.pdf.
68. I.R.S., UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE VS. CONTRACTOR DESIGNATION, https://www.irs.
gov/newsroom/understanding-employee-vs-contractor-designation.
69. Supra note 67.
70. Id.
71. I.R.S., BEHAVIORAL CONTROL, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-sel
f-employed/behavioral-control, (“When and where to do the work, what tools or equipment
to use, what workers to hire or to assist with the work, where to purchase supplies and services,
what work must be performed by a specified individual, what order or sequence to follow
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The behavioral control category refers to facts that show whether the
employer has a right to control or direct the work in which the worker is
engaged.72 The IRS is careful to point out that the business does not have to
exercise control over the way the work is done, it need only have the right to
exercise that control.73 The financial control category concerns whether the
employer has a right to direct or control the financial and business aspects of
the worker’s job, including the employer’s investment in equipment,
unreimbursed expenses, and the method of payment.74 Finally, the type of
relationship factor depends on both the business and worker’s perception of
their relationship: the existence of employee-type benefits, the permanency
of the relationship, and whether the services provided are a key activity of
the business.75
Unlike the ABC test, which in some states requires that freedom from
control be contractually demonstrated,76 the IRS test focuses on the material
facts and circumstances of the worker relationship itself and deemphasizes
“the designation or description of the relationship by the parties.”77 For the
type of relationship factor, the IRS clarifies that a written contract describing
the relationship between the parties is relevant evidence, but a designation
of independent contractor or employee status in a written contract is
insufficient to determine worker status.78

when performing the work”); I.R.S., FINANCIAL CONTROL, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/
small-businesses-self-employed/financial-control, (“Significant investment in the equipment,
unreimbursed expenses, opportunity for profit or loss is often an indicator of an independent
contractor, services available to the market, method of payment”); I.R.S., TYPE OF
RELATIONSHIP, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/type-of-rela
tionship, (“Written contracts, employee benefits, permanency of the relationship, services
provided as key activity of the business”).
72. I.R.S., BEHAVIORAL CONTROL, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businessesself-employed/behavioral-control.
73. Id.
74. I.R.S., FINANCIAL CONTROL, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-selfemployed/financial-control.
75. I.R.S., TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businessesself-employed/type-of-relationship.
76. Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in the Courts: An
Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. &
SOC. CHANGE 53, 68 (2015).
77. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
78. I.R.S., supra note 75.
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The ABC Test
A common formulation of the three-factor ABC test requires an
employer to prove that the worker is: A) free from the control and direction
of the employer, B) performs work that is outside the hirer’s usual business,
and C) customarily engages in a separate and independent business or
trade.79 Failing any one of the three factors means that the worker should be
classified as an employee and the employer, depending on the jurisdiction,
would be required to pay the state minimum wage, payroll taxes, worker’s
compensation, disability, overtime and paid leave.80 Variations of the ABC
test are present in more than thirty-eight states, most notably California,
Massachusetts, and New Jersey.81 Most states limit the test’s application to
specific areas, such as worker’s compensation or unemployment
compensation.82
Notably, the ABC test has the novel function of placing the onus on the
employer to prove that an independent contractor relationship exists. The
universal presumption against employers (which is part of the ABC
formulation in all but two states that adhere to the test)83 provides more
structure to the test in the sense that it requires an employer to prove the
legitimacy of the employment relationship in both typical and atypical
business structures.84 With the ABC test, courts no longer need to tailor their
analysis to well-established business structures and can rely on the
employer’s justification for the worker’s status.85 This has the additional
beneficial effect of overreaching unconventional business structures that
may have been created for the purpose of circumventing the law.86
Finally, an across-the-board implementation of the ABC test would
provide great advantages for states. Many states have a patchwork of
separate tests for worker classification in different statutory areas, such as
those governing claims and benefits, taxes, unemployment insurance, or
workers compensation.87 Though this would require a federal acceptance of
the ABC test, a uniform application of the ABC tests across all statutory
79. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Gig-Dependence: Finding the Real Independent
Contractors of Platform Work, 39 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 379, 409 (2019).
80. Rich Ehisen, California Bill Highlights Worker Misclassification Debate, LAW360:
ST. NET CAP. J. (June 28, 2019, 5:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1174238/cali
fornia-bill-highlights-worker-misclassification-debate.
81. Pearce & Silva, supra note 45, at 27.
82. Ehisen, supra note 80.
83. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 76, at 71.
84. Pearce & Silva, supra note 45, at 27.
85. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 76, at 71.
86. Id. at 72.
87. Id. at 73.
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areas would simplify compliance for employers.88 The shift to systematic
implementation of the ABC test represents not only a shift to a more
simplified and fairer test, but also a unified and consistent standard across all
relevant law.
However, the ABC test has been criticized for merely hiding the “right
to control” factors that it displaces.89 In New Jersey, the state’s supreme court
interpreted factor A, “free from control or direction over the performance of
such service,” as incorporating several of the factors from the IRS’s twentyfactor “right to control” test.90 Thus, prong A of the ABC test can entail some
of the same uncertainties and ambiguities as the common law formulation.91
Without the guidance of multifactor tests for control, the ABC test has been
criticized for sacrificing flexibility for clarity and uniformity. The binary,
all-or-nothing approach that the test presents can be problematic when an
employer fails to meet all three requirements, despite overwhelming
evidence that the worker is an independent contractor rather than an
employee.92 Ultimately, these critiques boil down to the tension between the
worker-employer relationship, which necessarily exists on a spectrum, and
the binary determinations of a court implementing the ABC test.93
PENALTIES AS A MECHANISM FOR COMPLIANCE
ABC tests often include strict enforcement measures to disincentivize
worker misclassification.94 Under the common law scheme, a misclassifying
business is penalized with back taxes, back pay, and benefits that merely
place the business in the same position they would have been if they had
properly classified the worker.95 In contrast, states utilizing the ABC test
have enforced harsher punitive measures such as fines and potential criminal
liability.96 Seven states have implemented increased penalties for any

88. PEARCE & SILVA, note 45, at 29.
89. Id.
90. Carpet Remnant Warehouse, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t. of Labor, 125 N.J. 567, 590 (1991).
91. Edward Zelinsky, Complexity Is The Cost Of Calif.’s Worker Classification Law,
LAW360: ST. NET CAP. J. (Oct. 24, 2019, 5:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1212504/print?section=california.
92. Pearce & Silva, supra note 45, at 29-30.
93. Id.
94. Pearce & Silva, supra note 45, at 28-29.
95. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 76, at 75 (quoting Christopher Buscaglia,
Crafting a Legislative Solution to the Economic Harm of Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 111, 121 (2009).
96. Id. at 75, 77.
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business that violates the statute and eight states have implemented civil
penalties for businesses that intentionally violate the statute.97
Ten states have implemented criminal liability for intentional
misclassification.98 Criminal liability could be an effective tool for state
governments to penalize large-scale offenders with off-the-book workforces
and insolvency to protect them from back taxes or fines.99 In New Mexico
and New York, violation of the statute is a misdemeanor subject to
prosecution by the state attorney general.100 Connecticut, New Jersey,
Illinois, and Utah have subjected violating businesses to low-level
felonies.101 Massachusetts and New York allow for fines up to $50,000 for
intentional violations, though New York had only prosecuted six cases
through 2010.102 Nevertheless, the added enforcement measures provide
greater discouragement for intentional misclassification.
BRIGHT-LINE VS. MULTIFACTOR
The central point of tension between the variations of the common law
“right to control” tests and the ABC test is the difference in the number of
factors courts must assess. The simple three-pronged approach of the ABC
test clarifies the law and instructs employers in how to comply.103 A lower
number of applicable factors prevents courts from selectively ignoring some
factors in favor of others.104 Furthermore, the reduction in factors eliminates
the most easily manipulated factors, such as intent or location, used by
employers seeking to circumvent worker-classification standards.105 By
dividing their workforce into categories and varying the working conditions
of each group according to the multifactor test, a business could contort the
employment relationship and force its workers into the independent
contractor classification.106 Each of the ABC test’s criteria are dispositive,
forcing courts to focus on the factors presented, rather than whatever factors
appear pertinent to the case at hand.107
97. Id. at 75.
98. Id. at 77.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Jennifer Pinsof, A New Take on an Old Problem: Employee Misclassification in the
Modern Gig-Economy, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 341, 367 (2016).
104. Pearce & Silva, supra note 45, at 28; see Pinsof, supra note 103, at 368.
105. Pearce & Silva, supra note 45, at 28.
106. Dynamex Operations West, INC. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 4
Cal. 5th 903, 955 (2018).
107. Pearce & Silva, supra note 45, at 28.
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Without guidance on how to weigh the abundance of factors in the
multifactor tests, judges are left with broad discretion to conduct their
analysis, creating room for an unsound degree of subjectivity.108 This has the
compound effect of lessening predictability for businesses and workers.109
The unpredictability of multifactor tests is illustrated in a pair of factually
similar cases involving FedEx delivery drivers. In FedEx Home Delivery v.
NLRB, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
placed heavy emphasis on the drivers’ “entrepreneurial opportunity for gain
or loss” as a primary touchstone in their analysis.110 Focusing on the drivers’
ability to choose their own hours and breaks, what routes they follow, and
the fact that contractors could contract multiple routes and hire, compensate,
and dismiss their own workers, the court found that the FedEx drivers were
independent contractors.111
In Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered and ultimately rejected the
D.C. Court’s “entrepreneurial opportunity” rationale.112 Despite using the
same common law agency factors,113 the Ninth Circuit ruled that
“entrepreneurial opportunities do not undermine a finding of employee
status.”114 Instead, the court emphasized FedEx’s “great deal of control” over
the worker’s operations, including its control of the appearance of workers
and their vehicles, the assignment of specific service areas, and the
requirement that drivers work 9.5-11 hours a day, holding that the FedEx
drivers were employees.115 This example demonstrates the varying and
unpredictable results that can arise from use of the same multifactor tests.
“HYBRID” WORK CLASSIFICATIONS: A THIRD CATEGORY?
Some commentators have proposed a “hybrid” work classification
category to supplement the independent contractor-worker dichotomy. In a
report sponsored by the Hamilton project, former Deputy Secretary of Labor
Seth Harris and Princeton economist, Alan Krueger advocate for a hybrid
“independent worker” category as a default classification for gig workers.116
Under this “independent worker” category, workers would be afforded civil
108. Id. at 17.
109. Id. at 18.
110. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 385 F.3d 492, 503 (2009).
111. Id. at 499.
112. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 993 (2014).
113. See id. at 989.; see also FedEx Home Delivery, 385 F.3d at 506.
114. Alexander, 765 F.3d at 987.
115. Id. at 990.
116. SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS
FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” 2 (2015).
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rights protections, tax withholding, employer contributions for payroll taxes,
worker’s compensation, the right to organize and bargain collectively under
the National Labor Relations Act,117 and the antidiscrimination protections
of Title VII,118 but excluded from unemployment insurance benefits and
hours-based benefits such as overtime and minimum wage.119 One of the
foremost principles that guides their recommendation is the
“immeasurability of work hours” for gig workers.120 The difficulty with
measuring work hours for Uber and Lyft drivers, Harris and Krueger argue,
emerges from the ambiguity of time spent waiting between rides.121 Drivers
could be spending that time working for another gig platform or for personal
use, making accurate work hour measurement impossible.122
In a report for the Economic Policy Institute, Ross Eisenbrey and
Lawrence Mishel push back against this contention, arguing it downplays
the role that big data plays in the gig economy.123 Uber and Lyft both
routinely track driver work hours when they present information to the
public, basing their measurements on the amount of time the app was turned
on.124 Uber assumes that drivers are “active” when their app is turned on,
monitoring acceptance rates and dismissing drivers who do not maintain a
sufficient acceptance rate.125 Moreover, a ride request that is not accepted
within 15 seconds is treated as refused, meaning that Harris and Krueger’s
claim that a driver could engage in personal work or work for another
platform rests on shaky ground.126
Still, proponents argue that third category would be an apt adjustment
to the rapidly changing digital marketplace.127 This hybrid work
classification would fit the needs of workers in an increasingly casual work
economy without placing an undue burden on their employers.128 By
automatically sorting gig workers into a hybrid “dependent contractors”
category, the uncertainty surrounding worker classification in the gig
economy would be eliminated.129 This would resolve litigation across the

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964); HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 116, at 17-18.
HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 116, at 2.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 2.
Id.
EISENBREY & MISHEL, supra note 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CHERRY & ALOISI, supra note 21, at 646.
Id. at 647.
Id.
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board, freeing up the resources of both the judicial system and on-demand
platforms.130
However, the creation of a “hybrid” worker classification for workers
in the gig economy would necessitate a distinction between the worker rights
that are included or excluded under that category. Excluding gig workers
from minimum compensation protections would likely alienate the drivers
that are already struggling with low pay.131 Furthermore, the creation of a
third category makes predictability difficult for workers and employers, as
the third category introduces yet another uncertainty to a formerly binary
system that was already complicated enough. When applied, it often makes
for another intricate test courts and employers must grapple with.132
Beyond the issue of benefits, legislative creation of a hybrid worker
classification category, as a practical matter, would be an incredible feat.
Debates over which rights to include under the category would likely be
hotly contested, and given that the law typically lags behind technological
advances, the resultant legislation may quickly become outdated.133 The
likelihood of judges creating such a category by way of judicial carveout is
slim, due to the way in which the statutes are written, and would require
extreme judicial activism.134 With the abundance and complexity of these
issues, it seems unlikely that the hybrid worker classification category will
come to fruition in the United States.
CALIFORNIA
California, with numerous metropolitan hubs, is a boon for the ondemand economy. Uber’s net impact on California is $390 million annually
and Uber rider benefits have been calculated to save $3.9 billion annually in
“amenity benefits” (“including improved comfort, safety,
weather protection, time and cost certainty/reliability, and flexibility of
schedule and destination choice”) and cost and time savings.135 However,
Uber’s ubiquitous presence and low barriers to entry have had a devastating
130. Id.
131. See Annie Nova, Uber drivers block traffic in Manhattan, protesting low pay and
poor working conditions, CNBC: PERS. FIN. (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/
09/17/uber-drivers-are-protesting-again-heres-what-the-job-is-really-like.html.
132. See CHERRY & ALOISI, supra note 21, at 660, (“Lavoratore parasubordinato” test).
133. See STEPHEN MERGENTHALER & KATHERINE GARRETT-COX, WORLD ECON. FORUM,
VALUES AND THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: CONNECTING THE DOTS BETWEEN
VALUE, VALUES, PROFIT AND PURPOSE 6 (2016) (“Given the Fourth Industrial Revolution’s
extraordinarily fast technological and social change, relying only on government legislation
and incentives to ensure the right outcomes is ill advised.”).
134. CHERRY & ALOISI, supra note 21, at 681.
135. ECON. DEV. RESEARCH GROUP, UBER’S ECONOMIC IMPACT IN CALIFORNIA (2016).
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impact on the taxi industry in California, causing the value of taxi medallions
in San Francisco to plummet.136 Furthermore, Uber and Lyft driver’s
classification as independent contractor allows the companies to avoid
certain payroll taxes, insurance, and administrative expenses.137 With the
passage Assembly Bill 5 (“AB5”), Uber and other gig economy platforms
are at the center of public debate on worker classification in the state, with
arguments raging over whether the impact of the legislation will be a net
harm or a net good. However, before delving into the nuts and bolts of AB5,
it is important to review the recent history of worker-classification law in the
state in order to better understand the evolution of worker-classification law
in California. As a state that has moved from the common law agency test to
the ABC test, California may be an instructive example for other states to do
the same.
In 1989, the Supreme Court of California decided a landmark workerclassification case concerning the workers’ compensation coverage of
seasonal workers. In Borello, the workers contracted with the growers in a
“sharefarmer” agreement, wherein the workers were to manage their own
labor, share the profit or loss from the crop yield, and agreed in writing that
they were not employees.138 The California Workers’ Compensation Act
mandated the use of the common-law “control-of-work” (“control”) test to
determine if a worker was an “employee” as defined by the statute: “whether
the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner
and means of accomplishing the result desired.”139
Aware of the dangers of a rigid and isolated application of the “control”
factor alone, the California Supreme Court decided to follow previous
decisions that supplemented the test with additional factors adopted from the
Second Restatement of Agency “Right to Control” Test.140 The court
followed common law rulings that recognized the right to discharge at will,
without cause creates a strong evidence in support of an employment
relationship.
However, finding that the common law and statutory differences
between “independent contractors” and “employees” were substantial (the
common law test was designed to define an employer’s liability for injuries
caused by his employee), the California Supreme Court was justified in

136. Ida Mojadad, Who’s Killing the Taxi Industry? (June 13, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.sfweekly.com/news/whos-killing-the-taxi-industry/.
137. Perez, supra note 14, at 796.
138. S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 345
(1989).
139. Id. at 350.
140. Id. at 351.
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making a slight departure from common law principles.141 The tension
between common law and statutory purpose prompted the court to follow the
path laid out by other states in worker-classification cases by considering the
remedial statutory purpose of the statute.142 The court then identified four
primary purposes of the California Workers’ Compensation Act: “(1) to
ensure that the cost of industrial injuries will be part of the cost of goods
rather than a burden on society, (2) to guarantee prompt, limited
compensation for an employee’s work injuries, regardless of fault, as an
inevitable cost of production, (3) to spur increased industrial safety, and (4)
in return, to insulate the employer from tort liability for his employees’
injuries.”143 Unrestrained by federal Congressional resistance to a more
liberal definition of “employee”, the court concluded that the Act intended
comprehensive coverage of injuries in employment and set out to perform
its analysis.144
However, after diagnosing the fundamental purposes of the statute, the
Supreme Court of California clarified that it was not adopting “detailed new
standards for examination of the issue.”145 Concluding that it was permissible
to utilize the factors set out in previous cases while according deference to
the Act’s purposes, the court found that growers had failed to meet their
burden of proving that the workers were “independent contractors.”146
Already, deference to statutory purpose in the “control” test evinced a
progressive trend towards granting “employee” classification to workers
performing simple labor. By formulating the “control” test in a way that was
reflective of legislative intent, Borello effectuated a worker-classification
scheme that was aligned with the progressive interests of Californians. After
Dynamex, it was clear that this trend was not an aberration.
Dynamex, decided 29 years after Borello, represents a significant shift
in the landscape of worker-classification law in California and a further
embracement of a progressive attitude towards the granting of “employee”
status. Dynamex concerned a same-day courier and delivery service that
converted all of its delivery drivers to independent contractors, requiring the
drivers to pay for their own vehicles and transportation expenses, including
tolls, vehicle maintenance, fuel, and vehicle liability insurance, as well as all
taxes and workers’ compensation insurance.147 Two drivers sued, alleging
141. Id. at 352.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 354.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 360.
147. Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 4 Cal. 5th
903, 917 (2018).
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that they were misclassified as independent contractors and that as a result,
Dynamex was violating the provisions of an Industrial Welfare Commission
wage order governing the transportation industry.148
The Supreme Court of California held that the “suffer or permit to
work” definition of “employ” in the wage order is the proper rubric for
evaluating whether a worker is an independent contractor or employee for
purposes of the obligations set forth in the wage order, but diverged from the
multi-factor test from Borello and the decisions before it.149 Launching into
a lengthy summary of pre-Borello worker-classification cases and Borello
itself, the court characterizes Borello not as a case exemplifying the common
law standard for distinguishing employees from independent contractors, but
as a case that resolves such issues by looking to the purpose and scope of the
particular statute.150
With the Borello emphasis on statutory purpose in mind, the court set
out to distill the primary objectives of the Industrial Welfare Commission’s
wage orders, finding that the wage orders were adopted to protect worker
health and safety and ensure that workers are afforded a level of wages and
working conditions that allow them to obtain at least a subsistence standard
of living.151 The legislature found these measures necessary due to the
unequal bargaining power between hiring businesses and individual workers
and the likelihood that workers would accept substandard wages and
working conditions.152
The wage orders also serve the dual purpose of guaranteeing that lawabiding businesses will not be hurt by unfair competition from businesses
that provide substandard wages and working conditions for their
employees.153 Recognizing that the remedial purposes of the wage order
would not be achieved without a scope that would be broad enough to
eliminate inadequate wages and working conditions, the court concluded that
the suffer or permit to work standard must be interpreted broadly to include
as “employees” any worker that can reasonably be viewed as working in the
hiring entity’s business.154
The court notes that federal courts have recognized that the standard
should be broader and more inclusive than the preexisting common law test
for worker-classifications when interpreting the suffer or permit to work

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 914.
Id. at 916.
Id. at 934.
Id. at 952.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 953.
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standard set forth in the Fair Labor Standards Act.155 The court then
undertakes an evaluation of the existing common law standards for
distinguishing “employee” from “independent contractor,” acknowledging
that there are advantages to the multifactor, totality-of-the-circumstances
approach that Borello and other common law tests have utilized.156 However,
the flexibility of the multifactor test presents significant problems (most of
which have been addressed under the “Bright-Line vs. Multifactor”
heading), especially in the wage and hour context.157
Finally, the court points out that California’s adoption of the suffer or
permit to work standard predates the FLSA, meaning that California’s IWC
never intended to adopt the economic reality test that federal agencies use.158
In fact, prior decisions in California had expressly declined to use that test,
noting that California wage orders are intended to provide broader protection
than those under the federal standard.159
Importantly, this issue presents a significant judicial roadblock for other
states that included the suffer or permit to work standard after the enactment
of the FLSA and had been interpreted to incorporate the economic reality
test.160 After launching into a discussion of the various benefits of the ABC
test, the California Supreme Court concluded that the ABC test is most
consistent with the history and purpose of the suffer or permit to work
standard in California’s wage orders.161
California’s path from the common law agency test to the ABC test
essentially boils down to the embracement of statutory purpose. This path
was paved with deference to the intended reach of the remedial purposes of
the California Worker’s Compensation Act and the Industrial Welfare
Commission’s wage orders in Borello and Dynamex respectively, first by
formulating the common law test in a way that reflected legislative intent,
and then replacing it with the ABC test when it was clear that the common
law test could not comport with the purpose of the statute at issue. As pointed
out in Dynamex, other states who have adopted their definition of
“employee” from any of the myriad of federal labor protection laws may find
it difficult to change their test with the governing federal common law
standard looming over them.162 Altogether, those states may be forced to
155. Id.
156. Id. at 954.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 956.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 956-7.
162. See id. at 956 (“Unlike a number of our sister states that included the suffer or permit
to work standard in their wage and hour laws or regulations after the FLSA had been enacted
and had been interpreted to incorporate the economic reality test, California’s adoption of the
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confront this issue by legislative amendment. Whether or not the ABC test
is incorporated federally, the road from the common law to the ABC test
necessitates an embracement of statutory purpose.
ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 5
California’s Assembly Bill 5 provides that for the purposes of the
provisions of the Labor Code, the Unemployment Insurance Code, and the
wage orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission, a worker is considered
an employee rather than an independent contractor unless the employer
meets the three dictates of the ABC test: (A) The person is free from the
control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance
of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and in
fact; (B) The person performs work that is outside the usual course of the
hiring entity’s business; (C) The person is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature
as that involved in the work performed.163 If they do not, those workers are
entitled to benefits (unemployment insurance, work injury compensation,
break time, paid sick leave, and minimum wage) and the right to unionize.164
The law is estimated to cover more than half of the independent contractors
in California, but reclassification is not automatic.165 Instead, independent
contractors must challenge their classification by filing lawsuits or
complaints with the appropriate government agency.166 The law also
empowers city attorneys to pursue lawsuits against noncompliant
businesses.167
The law does not provide an employee presumption for everyone.
Workers in certain specified areas are exempted from coverage, and a vast
majority of them are subject to the Borello test rather than the ABC test if
the applicable criteria are met.168 For instance, certain medical professionals
(physicians, surgeons, dentists, podiatrists, psychologists, or veterinarians
licensed by the State of California) performing medical services for a health
suffer or permit to work standard predated the enactment of the FLSA. Thus, as a matter of
legislative intent, the IWC’s adoption of the suffer or permit to work standard in California
wage orders was not intended to embrace the federal economic reality test.”)
163. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(a)(1) (repealed Sept. 2020).
164. James S. Azadian, 2020: New Year, New Decade, and New Laws, 62 No. 3 ORANGE
COUNTY LAWYER 46, 46 (2020).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 46-7; see EMPLOYMENT DEV. DEP’T, HELP US FIGHT FRAUD, https://www.
edd.ca.gov/payroll_taxes/Help_Fight_Fraud.htm.
167. Azadian, supra note 164, at 46-7.
168. Bruce Sarchet et al., The Potential Effects of Calif. Contractor Reclassification Bill,
LAW 360 (2019).
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care entity are subject to the Borello test.169 Outside of these occupational
exemptions, workers providing “professional services” (marketing
professionals, human resources administrators, graphic designers, grant
writers, fine artists, travel agents, freelance writers, IRS tax professionals,
esthetician, electrologist, barbers and cosmetologists, freelance
photographers, and payment processing agents) are also subject to the
Borello test,170 provided that the hiring entity proves the existence of six
factors.171 The rationale behind this exemption is to allow a contracting
business to receive services from a worker employed by another business,
with the contract between the contracting business and the professional
service provider being governed by the Borello test.172
There are similar exemptions that apply the Borello test for real estate
licensees and repossession agencies;173 work performed by a business entity
formed as a sole proprietor, partnership, LLC, or corporation for a
contracting business;174 subcontractors in the construction industry;175
relationships between referral agencies and service providers;176 and
individuals performing services with a licensed “motor club.”177 These
exemptions signify an attempt on the part of the legislature to address the
rigidity of the ABC test in situations where it would create major inequities
or cause undue economic turmoil.
Companies that rely on gig workers would like an exemption as well.
On December 30, 2019, Uber and its gig economy affiliate, Postmates, filed
169. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(B)(2) (repealed Sept. 2020).
170. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(c)(2) (repealed Sept. 2020), (Note: additional restrictions
may apply).
171. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(c)(1) (repealed Sept. 2020), (“(A) The individual
maintains a business location, which may include the individual’s residence, that is separate
from the hiring entity. Nothing in this subdivision prohibits an individual from choosing to
perform services at the location of the hiring entity. (B) If work is performed more than six
months after the effective date of this section, the individual has a business license, in addition
to any required professional licenses or permits for the individual to practice in their
profession. (C) The individual has the ability to set or negotiate their own rates for the services
performed. (D) Outside of project completion dates and reasonable business hours, the
individual has the ability to set the individual’s own hours. (E) The individual is customarily
engaged in the same type of work performed under contract with another hiring entity or holds
themselves out to other potential customers as available to perform the same type of work.
(F) The individual customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment
in the performance of the services.”)
172. Sarchet, supra note 168.
173. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(d) (repealed Sept. 2020).
174. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(e) (repealed Sept. 2020).
175. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(f) (repealed Sept. 2020) (Note: additional restrictions
apply).
176. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(g) (repealed Sept. 2020).
177. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(h) (repealed Sept. 2020).
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a lawsuit against the state of California, aiming to have AB5 declared invalid
or to exempt them from coverage.178 The lawsuit, filed two days before AB5
was set to take effect, alleges that the law is unconstitutional and unfairly
targets gig economy companies and their workers.179 More specifically, Uber
said in a statement that it brought the challenge “on the basis of lack of equal
protection and due process under both federal and state law.”180 Judge Dolly
M. Gee, presiding over the District Court for the Central District of
California, refused to grant an preliminary injunction, noting that though
Uber and Postmates had shown some measure of irreparable harm, public
interest and the balance of equities weighed in favor of California enforcing
the legislation.181 Uber made a statement declaring that it is reviewing the
decision and deciding whether or not it will pursue an appeal.182
Uber isn’t alone in its criticism of AB5. In the months preceding the
enactment of the law and in its immediate wake, AB5 was the recipient of
harsh criticism from various legal scholars and commentators. Larry Buhl,
writing for the Business Insider, points out that hiring businesses in
California may start to outsource some of their labor to neighboring states.183
A media company has already placed an ad looking for out-of-state
journalists to cover stories about California.184 Another article warns future
retirees not to rely on gig work or a contractual relationship with a former
employer as supplemental income, as companies may not want to provide
benefits for employees that are not full time.185 Others share concern that
small businesses, rather than tech giants like Uber, will feel the brunt of the
law.186
In response to the uncertainty that AB5 has spawned, citizens and
lawmakers are desperately searching for ways to address the myriad of issues
that have come forward in AB5’s wake. Two months after the bill took
effect, 34 pieces of legislation were introduced to the California legislature,

178. Dara Kerr, Uber’s Last-Minute Bid to Beat Gig Worker Law is Latest of Many Tries,
CNET (Jan. 1, 2020).
179. Id.
180. Noam Schreiber, Uber and Postmates File Suit to Block California Freelancer Law,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 2019.
181. Olson v. California, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34710, 34746 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2020).
182. Jim Wilson, Judge Refuses to Block California’s Gig Worker Law During Suit, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2020).
183. Larry Buhl, California is Attempting a Massive Labor Experiment that Could Grow
into a Disaster for Millions of Workers, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2019).
184. Id.
185. Chris Carosa, Will California’s AB5 Law Gag Your Gig Retirement?, FORBES (Feb.
27, 2020).
186. See Bruce Willey, Why Entrepreneurs Should Be More Worried About Uber Than
AB5, ENTREPRENEUR (Jan. 6, 2020).
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most of which aiming at expanding the list of exempted occupations under
the law.187 A federal judge has already granted a preliminary injunction to
prevent AB5 from applying to independent truckers in the state.188
Unwilling to accept the massive financial losses that AB5 could entail,
Uber has launched its “Project Luigi,” a semi-clandestine scheme to build
Uber’s claim that drivers are sufficiently free and independent, and thus are
independent contractors under AB5.189 Some of these features (which are
only available to California drivers) have already been unveiled, such as the
ability to see estimated fares upfront, decline trips upfront based on
inadequacy of fares without penalty, and the addition of a “favorite” option,
which would allow a rider to prioritize chosen drivers and establish a direct
link between them, allowing the driver a “first pass” to accept a scheduled
trip.190 By shifting its business model within the jurisdiction, the changes
seek to provide drivers with more autonomy and a more direct relationship
with their clients, thereby strengthening its claim that drivers are more like
independent contractors than they are employees. Although this may satisfy
prong A of the ABC test (free from the control and direction of the
employer), Uber may have difficulties proving prongs B and C, unless it can
convince a court that it is a software company rather than a ride-provider,
which has already been resisted by courts.191
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to predict how AB5 will impact gig workers and the
companies they work for in California. In a brief three-month period, the law
has been the subject of heated debate, countless proposed amendments, and
a high-profile lawsuit. If Uber’s “Project Luigi” fails and it chooses not to
pursue an appeal on its failed preliminary injunction, stock prices will fall
and the company will take a financial hit, but the international tech giant will
likely survive. The success of AB5’s implementation will have a rippling
effect on other states such as New Jersey, whose Senate bill 4204, which
mimics AB5, is the subject of much debate in the state.192

187. John Myers, A Flood of Proposed Changes to California’s AB 5 Awaits State
Lawmakers, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2020).
188. Id.
189. Faiz Sidduiqi, Uber’s Secret Project to Bolster Its Case Against AB5, California’s
Gig-Worker Law, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2020).
190. Id.
191. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
192. Terrence T. MacDonald, Debate to Continue over NJ Bill Rewriting Rules for
Freelance Workers, Contractors, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Dec. 18, 2019).
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The creation of a third “intermediate” worker classification, while
innovative, may bring more complications than it does solutions because it
would undermine predictability for businesses and introduce yet another test
for employers and courts to interpret. Furthermore, the legislative effort
required to create a third category of worker classifications could prove to
be insurmountable.
Despite its rigidity, the worker-friendly ABC test best effectuates the
intent of Congress when it enacted broad, remedial New Deal labor
protections almost a century ago. California’s focus on statutory purpose
when it adopted the ABC test in Dynamex may be instructive to other states,
but without an incorporation of the ABC test at the federal level, some state
judicial systems may be hamstrung in making this change, as their state labor
protections were enacted after the passage of the Congressional legislation.

